 You are Visitor No:
|
INTRODUCTION
This paper is the concentrated summation of my life's work. It is a distillation crystallized out of the ethics of universalistic felicific utilitarianism. Until now, every time I read and reread the thousands upon thousands of pages I wrote to reach this point, I found revisions were needed, sometimes radical ones. In fact, the need to change the material again and again during the last five decades was and still is to a certain extent a constant obsession, causing me no little anguish. The result is that every sentence in the text has been crafted - one might even say chiselled out - to explicate the germinal principle which was the original inspiration of this ethics.
Underlying this principle is an idea so disarmingly simple that it may seem to many to be the stalest of cliche's. That idea is that everybody wants to be happy and avoid unhappiness. The "truth" of this idea in this simple form came to me with revelatory force one day at age sixteen in the little library of a boarding school in New Hampshire where I was experiencing a good deal of hazing. Like Descartes' "I think, therefore I am," this was the idea I could not doubt. Its value at the time was that it partially rescued me from a feeling of lovelessness and alienation that caused me a great deal of suffering from my earliest childhood and also made me very sorry for myself. But this self-pity was accompanied by a strong feeling of compassion for the suffering of others which, in this respect at least, enabled me to feel a common bond with the rest of humanity. It was this feeling of compassion that led me to the conclusion that devoting one's life to reducing unhappiness and increasing happiness ON A UNIVERSAL SCALE was the best thing a human being could do. This idea gave meaning to my life.
When I went to college and began to read the works of Jeremy Bentham, it seemed to me that his Greatest Happiness Principle which claimed that "the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question is the only right and proper and universally desirable end of human action" was exactly equivalent to my idea. That principle seemed to me the obviously valid criterion by which human beings could distinguish good and evil. What amazed me, however, was that there was so much opposition to Bentham's ideas. After years of puzzlement, I realized that my problem with Bentham and later with other utilitarians lay in the fact that their ethics differed substantially from the ethics I envisaged.
As I began to study Jungian psychology, I also became aware that Bentham's soulless sectarian attitude made him incapable of recognizing the human connection with the inner world of the autonomous psyche, which is the concern of all religions. To my mind, no system of ethics can leave this world out of account. These differences lead me to try to put my ideas in writing.
Not having the philosophical background to do this, I became a doctoral candidate at Columbia University. But except for the theologian, Paul Tillich, with whom I undertook special studies, the prevailing analytical approach to philosophy to my mind did not come to grips with the crucial problems of humanity in the twentieth century. For me, there was only one man who did and that man was Carl Jung. As a result, I applied to Jung to become his student and when he accepted me, I suspended my philosophical studies and spent two years in Zurich studying with Jung and his colleagues. Through my association with Tillich and Jung, the crucial significance of religion and depth psychology in the development of my ethics became clear and the influence of these two geniuses permeates my writing.
STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE
The ethics outlined here is designed to act as an organizing center for those motivated to work for a happier world. To mobilize and direct human energies to this end, the consequent imperative is: Everyone ought to act so as to reduce unhappiness and/or increase happiness with reference to the universal aggregate of those beings capable of experiencing these states of consciousness. This proposition will be referred to as the Universal Happiness Principle, the UHP or the Principle. It is assumed that the more people who adopt this principle as a transcultural ethical imperative and the higher its priority, the better the chances of accomplishing its objective.
Although this imperative, as it stands, is not unmeaningful, left unclarified, it is highly ambiguous and to that extent ineffective. Our purpose here is to resolve this ambiguity by semantic differentiation, thus laying the groundwork for a practical ethics to further the stated goal.
The substantial dissimilarities between the approach taken here and historical utilitarianism will be evident as we proceed. One key difference lies in the following definitions: Happiness or an hedonic state is posited here to refer exclusively to all those conditions of consciousness which the experient likes being aware of for their own sake. Unhappiness or an algetic state is posited to refer exclusively to all those conditions of consciousness which the experient dislikes being aware of for their own sake. Happiness and unhappiness are relatively opposite conditions of immediate affective awareness determined by the way their experients positively or negatively value these experiences according to these definitions.
These particular definitions are used because they encompass all the data which make a felicific ethics of concern to man. Their denotation, however, deviates substantially from many ordinary and legitimate usages of happiness and unhappiness. Unfortunately, the same would be even more true if cognate hedonic words were used. Yet adhering to these definitions, as specified, is essential to understanding this approach.
This problem, which seriously interferes with accurate communication, could be solved by the use of neologisms. For instance, 'eutony' could be used to stand for what we have defined as happiness and 'dystony' for unhappiness. The adjectives 'eutonic' and 'dystonic' could also be substituted for 'hedonic' and 'algetic' in our definitions. But such a departure from normal discourse would greatly complicate the communication process. For this reason, we will continue most of the time to use ordinary language. Nevertheless, to ensure that the exact intended meaning is conveyed or where the use of the words 'happiness' and 'unhappiness' would create more confusion than clarity, we will substitute these neologisms.
Using the new terminology, another way of stating the Principle is: Everyone ought to act so as to bring about a less dystonic (unhappy) and/or a more eutonic (happier) universe, whichever is greater under the circumstances, and at the same time for the same reason refrain from or prevent acts that will bring about a more dystonic and/or a less eutonic universe.
To experience eutony and dystony, the experient must be in a sufficiently differentiated state of affective awareness to make liking or disliking an experience for its own sake possible. A cognitive recognition of being in this state, however, is not essential, but of course it is a common accompaniment in human beings and usually intensifies the affect. In animals capable of these states, the level of introspection which constitutes this recognition probably does not occur.
There is also a third classification consisting of those conditions of being which are neither happiness nor unhappiness, as defined. In ordinary language, these conditions would usually be referred to as neutral states or states of indifference, but to conform to our categorization they will be designated by the neologism 'atony. When conscious, a state of atony exists when the subject has no particular reaction of liking or disliking an experience. Atony always obtains when the experient is unconscious or when the the level of consciousness is not sufficiently differentiated for an experience of eutony or dystony to be constellated.
Ethical and non-ethical aspects of happiness and unhappiness
Under these posited definitions, experiences of happiness are feelings in progress that have immediate feeling value for their experients. Similarly, experiences of unhappiness have immediate disvalue. These are given axiological descriptions to which ethical distinctions do not apply. In this non-ethical sense, happiness, as defined, always feels 'good' to its experient as unhappiness always feels 'bad.' The presence of eutony, dystony or atony is solely a function of the experient's positive, negative or neutral valuations of such immediate experiences. All other factors are irrelevant.
As soon as ethical factors are brought to bear on a situation, however, the immediate subjective valuations of good, invariably associated with happiness, and bad with unhappiness are no longer the sole value determinants, but preemptive valuations can supercede them. Depending on the chosen norm, some of the good feelings could then be ethically disapproved and some of the bad ones approved. If a utilitarian norm is used, these valuations are determined by the expectation of certain consequences. If the norm is the Universal Happiness Principle, decisions that the agent chooses in order to generate a dynamic in the direction of universal happiness would be approbated and those the agent chooses to generate an opposite dynamic would be disapprobated. An agent becomes ethically praiseworthy under the UHP when he or she makes choices that further the UHP's goal, the more so the more sacrifice is involved. Similarly, an agent becomes ethically blameworthy when s/he knows or should know that his or her choice is conducive to universal unhappiness, yet makes the choice anyway, disregarding the fact that better options were available. Blameworthiness obviously increases if such choices result from irresponsible indifference, selfishness or malice.
As used here,'universal' refers solely to that frame of reference (universe of universes) which encompasses the total aggregate of beings capable of experiencing happiness and unhappiness, as defined, wherever and whenever they may exist or come into existence in the future. No subset of such beings, however large, can be equated with this total aggregate. Unless this stipulation is agreed to, the Principle is fundamentally misinterpreted. To conform to the Principle, the agent must consciously cultivate an attitude that focuses on generating a dynamic in the direction of a happier universe. In actual situations, of course, the agent can only take into account those beings he is aware of whose happiness and unhappiness might be affected by his choices, but no beings, human, animal or others capable of these feelings can be excluded from full consideration. The ethics of the Principle becomes pertinent whenever in the flow of actual experience an agent or a group of agents acting in concert is confronted with choices involving significant eutonic and/or dystonic consequences to anyone.
The meaning of quantification of happiness and unhappiness
The meaning of quantity of value in relation to happiness and unhappiness in the present context is defined by the same interacting variables used in traditional felicific utilitarianism, namely, intensity, duration and extension.
Intensity refers to the degrees of preference and aversion individuals feel toward their experiences of happiness and unhappiness with zero degrees being atony. The other two variables being equal, the greater the preference, the greater the happiness and the greater the aversion, the greater the unhappiness.
Duration refers to the lengths of time that individuals perceive their experiences of happiness and unhappiness to last. The other two variables being equal, the longer or shorter the duration, the more or less the happiness or unhappiness.
Extension refers to the number of experients whose happiness or unhappiness comes under consideration. The other variables being equal, the more or less experients involved, the more or less eutony or dystony, as the case may be.
To estimate quantity of happiness and/or unhappiness in actual situations, these three variables must be summated. With regard to extension, Bentham's formula applies: Every being whose happiness or unhappiness is affected, including the agent, counts for one and no more than one.
To determine the choice that best conforms to the UHP, the total chain or chains of algedonic (happy and/or unhappy) consequences relative to all beings affected by the options available to the agent must be taken into account for as long as these consequences last, with due regard to the particular durations and intensities of these consequences as they affect each of these beings. The agent is then enjoined to do his best to make the choice that generates the greatest dynamic in the direction of universal happiness.
Critics of felicific utilitarianism have been quick to point out the limits to the accuracy with which hedonic and algetic values can be determined in actual situations or projected into the future. Because of the subjective nature of feeling values, using only the physical or behavioral criteria of the natural sciences to assess or verify algedonic values in applying the Principle is usually inadequate. Certainly, it is neither feasible nor useful in ordinary situations to try to "measure" happiness or unhappiness by the numerical devices of hedonic calculus. Such procedures would rightly be considered in most cases more of a hindrance than a help in applying the Principle. What we can be pretty sure of is that the day-to-day practical application of the UHP in relation to the higher animals and our neighbors usually does not require going through such laborious and questionable hedonic analysis.
The reason for explicating the above description of quantification is not so much to assist in applying the UHP as it is to define the meaning of quantification as it relates to any and all beings capable of happiness and unhappiness, as defined. This is essential in understanding the infrastructure prerequisite to any such application.
Materialistic rationalists will be sceptical of the universal conviction held by those religiously oriented that discarnate beings -- God, gods, angels, demons, ancestors, etc. -- exist and that some of these entities, at least, are capable of algedonic consciousness and interact with human beings, No doubt, some of these assumptions are anthropomorphic projections. Nevertheless, we cannot disregard the fact that the overwhelming majority of mankind shares this conviction. To the extent that this is actually the case, it follows that any algedonic affects resulting from this interaction must, to the extent possible, be taken into account in ethical decision-making.
John Stuart Mill's method of qualitatively distinguishing superior and inferior forms of happiness can be a useful method of evaluation with respect to the UHP. In one sense, of course, all such experiences are qualitatively unique insofar as they occur at unique points of time and place to unique experients. Nevertheless, generalizing these distinctions into classes of experience can be useful in differentiating affective phenomena in terms of their impact on universal happiness. For instance, the joy of giving happiness (or of lessening unhappiness) is under the UHP qualitatively a higher form of happiness than the joy of possession, even though both may be quantitatively equal as far as their hedonic value to the subject-agent is concerned. The reason for this is that when the algedonic consequences to others in addition to the subject-agent are taken into account, the joy of giving happiness adds to universal happiness more than the latter because it is by definition self-multiplying. This is not to say that the joy of possession, if it has no dystonic consequences, does not in itself add that much more to universal happiness. The difference is that the happiness of possession, because of the intemperate desire that often accompanies it, can be conducive to acts of cupidity and crime. When this happens, the UHP is transgressed since it deprives others of rightful benefits that would otherwise accrue. In either case, our proposition holds: the joy of giving is qualitatively superior to the joy of possession.
But it is also true that if universal happiness is quantitatively increased, taking into account the total algedonic consequences of the agent's act, then no matter what the qualities of the various happinesses may be, whether they consist of fun and games, eating good food or carnal pleasures on the one hand, or spiritual, artistic or intellectual joys on the other, their quantitative values with respect to the UHP's goal must be given due credit. There are times when the relaxation of unproductive entertainment may be the best means at the time to further universal happiness even though other alternatives may be considered more edifying. In such situations, as Bentham put it, "pushpin is as good as poetry." No doubt, the application of the UHP will have to deal with the myriad problems such value assessments will always pose. But, important as these practical problems are, our task here limits itself to the prerequisite concern of discriminating the ethical criterion by means of which such assessments should be judged in the first place.
Critics are right in maintaining that in determining choices affecting happiness, we often have no alternative but to make many of these choices on the basis of woefully inadequate knowledge and that the effectiveness of the UHP depends on the correctness of this knowledge. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, all of us assume we know enough about such matters in many cases to predict general trends. For example, few doubt that illness, deprivation, injury, or the devices of punishment and torture, however defined, are in the vast majority of instances conducive to their experients' unhappiness. The fact that even the most sceptical make algedonic value assessments of this kind every day without questioning them belies any doubts they may profess.
With regard to happiness, accurate judgments are admittedly harder to make since different individuals not only have different but often contrary tastes and preferences. Still, we can say that the arts and entertainment, intraculturally at any rate, usually owe their success to generally correct judgments of this kind. We can conclude then that, despite their limitations, subjective testimony, behavioral correlations, projections of cultural predispositions, intuition and sometimes even subjective extrapolation can often provide enough data to make choices that will effectively implement the UHP. The basic presupposition of this paper is that if this is achieved, however slightly, the world would be a better place to live in.
Affirming the Principle logically entails approbation of those who choose the alternative most likely to advance the cause of universal happiness, the more so in those instances in which the agent foregoes the ego's natural desire for personal happiness and accepts or chooses unhappiness for the sake of fulfilling the Principle. This is the altruistic component of the UHP. Essentially, a person is ethical under the UHP insofar as s/he tries to do this and unethical insofar as s/he knowingly disregards any uncompensated unhappiness s/he causes or could have avoided.
On the other hand, since the subject-agent does count for one, instances will occur where the agent, acting to promote his own happiness, may be the choice most likely to advance universal happiness. This is always true when no one else but the agent's happiness is involved. It is sometimes true even when unhappiness is caused to others. This is the hedonistic component in what is basically an altruistic ethics. Altruism, in fact, is disapproved of if it leads the beneficiaries of the agent's acts into the habit of exploiting others.
The UHP is a utilitarian ethics with a deontological component
If it is agreed that the ethical goal is to further the UHP, doesn't it stand to reason that when the reverse occurs, despite the good intentions of the agent, that the consequences are deplorable? Yes, it does, and we agree -- the consequences are deplorable, and sometimes grounds for suspicion as to the seriousness of these "good intentions," but this does not necessarily make it right to place moral blame on the agent unless he makes no effort to take whatever steps he can to prevent a repetition of his error. Similarly, the fact that malicious acts may sometimes backfire and result in an increase in universal happiness does not affect the moral reprehensibility of the act. This idea is illustrated, for example, in Goethe's "Faust" where the devil's malevolent intentions to his great chagrin become an instrument for Faust's salvation. This fact, however, does not make Mephistopheles any the less evil.
Regardless of consequences, however, regardless of whether the adage that "hell is paved with good intentions" is more than just an aphorism, acting to the best of one's ability with the intention of doing good must always be regarded to some extent as morally praiseworthy because good intentions constitute good will, which, as Kant rightly held, is prerequisite to the very idea of being ethical. And this is true under the UHP even in those circumstances in which ethical acts motivated by the will to increase universal happiness have just the opposite effect.
The raison d'e^tre for this ethics is the hope that the consequences of adopting it as a collective ideal will be a happier world, but if this does not occur, and that possibility cannot be rejected out of hand, the UHP in its own terms is without utilitarian value. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, the UHP can be justified on the deontological grounds that its adoption entails the exercise of a host of cognate moral virtues such as compassion, love (agape), kindness, caring, generosity, humaneness and benevolence whose practice Kant's categorical imperative must certainly approve. These are the non-consequentialist, deontological elements in what is presented as a consequentialist, utilitarian ethics. Here, however, the only "maxim," the only categorical imperative which this ethics is concerned to "will as a universal law" (to use Kantian terminology) is that it is everyone's duty to try to generate a dynamic toward universal happiness. Contrary to the absolutist claims of deontologists, however, all that is claimed for the UHP is that insofar as a happier world is affirmed as a better world, adopting the ethical infrastructure presented here is a logical deduction.
The UHP is a form of rule utilitarianism with an act utilitarian component
The peaceful settlement of disputes, equal justice for all regardless of race, creed, gender, wealth, class, nationality, etc., respecting and defending the freedom, dignity and rights of the less powerful from violation by the more powerful are universally approbated in all civilized societies. These ideals, which express the democratic ethos, are becoming more and more effectively codified nationally in the political precepts of constitutional government, internationally in the Charter and Declarations of the United Nations and in the regulations and legal structure of democratic institutions generally. Our assumption is that conforming to these standards in the vast majority of cases is conducive to universal happiness and non- conformance is conducive to universal unhappiness. If this is so, the UHP is basically a form of rule utilitarianism with a legal as well as an ethical tradition to support it.
Despite their generally ubiquitous acceptance, however, these rules are not inviolable. As the legal profession and most ethicists have long realized, there are occasions in which even the most universally affirmed rules and laws do not hold. In this ethics, the criterion for determining these exceptions is the UHP. Here is where conscience may come into play. But, as we all know, conscience can be a very questionable guide. In the context of this ethics, if (but only if) the operative factor in conscience is the UHP (it may be any number of other things), and the agent is convinced that under the special circumstances of the existing situation obeying the rule in question violates it, disobedience may be justified. This is the act utilitarian component in what is essentially a rule utilitarian ethics. Act utilitarianism becomes a valid alternative when one becomes convinced that the application of a rule, considered valid by the dominant culture, religion or controlling establishment is conducive to universal unhappiness. In such cases, non-compliance or even violation should be seriously considered. 'Rule' here means any imperative that influences ethical conduct.
Nevertheless, acting against such rules ought not to be undertaken without the most careful circumspection. This can sometimes result in the most agonizing dilemmas. Let us examine one that illustrates how tension between act and rule utilitarianism operates under the UHP. Serious lying in certain instances may be the best way of decreasing unhappiness within the narrow purview of a particular situation; still, such lying may generate a gradient (slippery slope) which in the long run is conducive to transgressing the UHP. This is especially liable to be the case if the motives of the agent are self-regarding or in danger of becoming public. Certainly, any habitual tendency to lie is conducive to undermining the moral fiber, not only of the liar, but of his milieu as well. Also, the knowledge of the profound fallibility one shares with the rest of humanity should give one pause before disregarding the imperative not to lie.
Despite these provisos, lying cannot be totally prohibited under the UHP. To help Jews escape the Nazis in Hungary, the man who eventually became Pope John XXIII signed a large number of false baptismal certificates. The UHP certainly justifies this act whereas a strict Kantian deontologist might be hard put to do so. In "Les Miserables," Victor Hugo obviously wanted his readers to have sympathy for the "criminal" Jean Valjean who stole a loaf of bread to feed his starving family, and to applaud the bishop's decision to lie to protect him from another conviction when he stole the bishop's silver. Under the circumstances of the novel, these actions were justified by the UHP even though that same Principle also strongly supports the rules not to steal or lie. On the other hand, the deontological devotion to the law exhibited by police inspector Javert horrifies us by the misery he causes.
Another example: A strict deontological proponent of non-violence or pacifism could not approve or take part in war, even the war against fascism. Under the UHP, however, although peace and non-violence are ethically desirable goals, that war, if any, was justified. On the other hand, in the name of that same Principle, refusing to fight in Vietnam could also be justified. Sometimes glaring examples occur in which an entire value structure (ethos, ideology, religion) acted upon by millions can be responsible for incalculable increases in universal unhappiness. Under totalitarianism, dictatorship or an elitist government, for instance, key principles, laws and injunctions laid down by such regimes are better violated than obeyed. Exceptions to the rules are least liable to occur in a democratic society that aspires to be all-inclusive in regarding the happiness of all beings as equally entitled to consideration. If a doctrine -- religious, ethical or ideological -- disagrees with this, it disagrees with the UHP.
Whatever conscious will there may be for one to transcend one's ego desires in order to lessen universal unhappiness, virtually every human being harbors contradictory impulses which seriously interfere with its effectiveness in this regard. Sometimes these impulses are conscious, but more often they are unadmitted, undifferentiated or quite unconscious. It is in these latter cases that perhaps the greatest violations of the UHP occur among well-meaning people. Only by taking on the difficult ethical task of becoming conscious of and facing up to these opposing drives is it possible, at least to some extent, to reduce their influence and have one's avowed feelings of compassion and benevolence become effectively available to advance the cause of the UHP. For this task one needs all the help one can get from transcendent as well as human resources. The introspective and reflective attention to one's self this requires is quite distinct from the egotism and lack of regard for others which would lead to violations of the UHP.
By itself, the UHP will never be able to resolve differences as to how its goal may best be implemented. Different situations involving different beings and divergent cultures will always raise unique problems that demand creative solutions. Nor will adopting the UHP by any means eliminate the agonizing ethical dilemmas more and more faced by modern man with his ever-growing technological powers, or the sharp disagreements as to which option will best fulfill the Principle. That is the never-ending task of a practical ethics derived from that Principle, but that task cannot be adequately dealt with until the normative basis for such an ethics is sufficiently clarified. That is our purpose here.
The place of Negative Utilitarianism in the Universal Happiness Principle
In formulating the Universal Happiness Principle, we have deliberately placed the goal of reducing unhappiness before that of increasing happiness in recognition of the persuasive emphasis of negative utilitarianism. Generally speaking, when there is a choice between the two, priority should be given to reducing and eliminating unhappiness before turning to the goal of generating or increasing happiness because attention to the former usually generates a greater dynamic in the direction of universal happiness than if first consideration is given to the happiness factor. Only with the advent of negative utilitarianism in this century has the role of the dynamics of unhappiness begun to receive the attention it deserves. Although we disagree with those who would regard reducing unhappiness as the only legitimate utilitarian goal, this emphasis is a much needed counterbalance to offset the traditional tendency of felicific utilitarians to concern themselves primarily with the happiness factor, and, by so doing, neglect the usually more important obligation to reduce unhappiness. Of course, if the Buddha was right in maintaining that earthly life is essentially suffering, the imperative of the Principle would be wholly directed in the last analysis to the reduction of universal unhappiness.
Ways of fulfilling the Universal Happiness Principle
The purpose of the Principle is fulfilled whenever, as a result of an agent's deliberate action or refraining from action motivated by the Principle or some equivalent, the balance of happiness (less unhappy/happy/more happy experiences) over unhappiness (less happy/unhappy/more unhappy experiences) is greater in perpetuity for those affected than it would have been if this action or refraining from action had not occurred.
A less unhappy, happier and therefore a better world may bebrought about in the following ways:
1) By generating an overall reduction or elimination of unhappiness under circumstances that do not give rise to greater unhappiness when all affected are taken into account.
2) By generating those forms of happiness that are self- multiplying or not offset by dystonic trends when all affected are taken into account.
3) By reducing, eliminating or foregoing happiness when not to do so will result in a balance of greater unhappiness and/or less happiness when all affected are taken into account.
4) By choosing, enduring or inflicting unhappiness on oneself or inflicting it on others when that is the only way to prevent greater unhappiness in the long run for all affected, or when this unhappiness will be compensated by a greater balance of less unhappiness or more happiness in the future.
Thus, implementing or conforming to the Universal Happiness Principle often calls for discipline, sacrifice and restraint on the part of those capable of acting on this Principle. On the other hand, simple acts of thoughtful consideration and kindness can produce these results as well as heroic deeds and ego- effacing altruism.
Values and criteria that compete or conflict with the Principle
Prevailing attitudes, ideals, policies and beliefs -- political, religious or secular -- all have an enormous impact on the course of happiness. The same is true of social expectations, cultural traditions, biological drives and personal commitments. In fact, there are few activities with which human beings are seriously concerned that do not have a substantial influence on the course of happiness. Consequently, they are of direct relevance in applying the UHP, and anyone who affirms this Principle must constantly keep this in mind and assess the algedonic effects that occur as a result of these activities.
Some of these activities tend to reinforce the Principle; others ignore it; others are so vague as to be little more than targets for unconscious or wishful projections. Some like bigotry, fascism, dictatorship, elitism and totalitarianism work explicitly against the Principle. Sometimes, however, it can be quite difficult to sort out which is which. Those who wish to implement the UHP always need to be ready to re-evaluate their accustomed axiological attitudes in the light of the UHP. This involves a constant growth process that will often require great flexibility and dedication to the Principle's goal. Of course, all this is irrelevant to those who regard progress toward a happier world as having a low priority, or who just disregard it altogether.
The Principle is melioristic and has no final goal
To avoid taxing human nature beyond its capabilities, and to take into account the power of the many ethical dynamics opposing the UHP, a melioristic position is the only feasible approach. Unless the violation of the UHP is clear, people do not have to give up other values they will not, or cannot and perhaps sometimes should not relinquish. Actually, the only essential requirement for the Principle to be effective is that it become more of a focus in practical decision-making and this of itself could well lead to positive achievement.
Expressed with the maximum imperative force as the supreme criterion of value (summum bonum), the formulation of the Principle would be: The sole constant and supreme ethical responsibility of all beings capable of assuming it, whether acting as private individuals or as members of collectives of whatever composition, ought to be to carry out to the best of their knowledge and with all the strength of will at their disposal those courses of action most likely to bring about a less unhappy, happier universe. To neglect this obligation or to espouse anything that opposes it is ethically wrong.
In this utopian form, however, the Principle is too radical a departure from the present cultural patterns of all societies to be acceptable to the vast majority of mankind. Yet it is a perfectly logical inference from the Principle. It is not, however, a necessary entailment. If it were, the Principle would indeed be for the generality of humankind "too good to be practical," to use Bentham's phrase. To reject the Principle as necessarily the Highest Good, however, by no means entails abandoning it altogether. It can to a certain extent coexist with other values that preempt it. It can also be expressed with less urgency and still retain effectiveness. The Hippocratic precept, "First, do no harm," adapted to the UHP as "At least, refrain from acts that add to universal unhappiness," is quite consistent with the Principle.
The ethical imperatives most likely to be superordinate to the UHP are connected with religion. The fact is that the vast majority of human beings is dedicated to one or more of an endless variety of conflicting myths deriving from transcendent sources. The irresistably numinous god-images engendered by these myths in the millions who are grasped by them often evoke such passionate conviction that they exercise willy-nilly a decisive influence on human conduct. Such influences may result in furthering the UHP, or they may oppose it. But if the latter, a principle like the UHP, which rests solely on the simple rational appeal that working toward a happier world is a good thing, would be unlikely to inspire the devotional strength necessary for it to take precedence over deep-seated religious convictions. Still, in many cases, the UHP may be acceptable as a conditional imperative. This conditionality can be formulated as follows: Insofar as X superordinate imperative (resulting from "divine revelation," charismatic authority, religious teaching, sacred scripture, cultural tradition, etc,) will permit, act so as to bring about a less unhappy, happier universe. Such a formulation may allow for the affirmation of at least some values in the agent's ethical inventory that are consonant with the UHP.
Another factor inevitably impeding the implementation of the UHP is the natural tendency to be loyal to and favor one's valued in-groups over unknown or unfamiliar outsiders. This universal tendency of human nature, especially when intensified by shadow projection, can cause mutual suspicion, enmity and discord between groups that can escalate from interpersonal, family and local quarrels to wars, massacres and genocide. Justice under the UHP, however, requires the application of the principle of universal extension. This means that all centers of consciousness capable of eutony and dystony must be taken into account equally whenever the dynamics of happiness are affected. In this respect, universal happiness preempts the happiness of any smaller collective whether it be family, community, tribe, nation, religious affiliation, etc.
We are becoming increasingly aware of how critically the world's happiness level depends on the way we treat our physical environment -- inanimate as well as animate. Similarly, spiritual and psychic factors play an essential role in this regard. In fact, success or failure in the practical implementation of the Universal Happiness Principle depends most of all on the way we deal with our ecological and spiritual problems.
Despite the many pressures, secular and religious, that oppose the Principle, most moral and religious traditions revere acts of universal compassion and humaneness which, to the degree that they truly encompass all beings capable of happiness and unhappiness, are always in accord with the Principle. The higher the priority of these virtues in the ethical hierarchy, the greater the chances that the UHP will be effective. To be sure, the Principle will undoubtedly often make demands that test human knowledge, wisdom and, most of all, will power to the limit. But then, ethics never exhorts the paths of least resistance. If it did, we would have no need of it.
Although it may seem to some that the UHP, as elucidated, allows too much flexibility and is therefore too open to rationalization, there is a clear limit to that flexibility, a point at which no compromise is allowable without unacceptable distortion of its essence. Those who adopt the Principle must always strive, as we have said, to consider the total extension of those whose happiness is affected by their acts, even when, as is often the case, this can only be vaguely estimated. In addition, whenever possible, the variables of intensity and duration, despite their inherently subjective nature, must be taken into account. The agent cannot downgrade or upgrade these values or disvalues on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality, religion, culture, power, education, wealth, class, caste, gender, sexual preference, appearance, intelligence, etc. These assertions are not merely inferences among others that might be drawn from the Principle, but logical entailments of its adoption. Moreover, if they are not complied with, disciplinary measures which involve inflicting unhappiness are often justified to prevent or deter the increases of universal unhappiness that would otherwise occur. Such actions, however, should not be taken with impunity, that is, without taking into account the universal human right of every person to pursue his own happiness and to be free as long as this does not infringe on the equal right of others to pursue that same happiness and freedom. Major infringements of this sort justify the collective coercive measures of a legal system conditioned, of course, by the constitutional requirements for a fair trial, legitimate evidence, not inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, etc. Military measures also can not be excluded. In other words, the UHP is wholly consonant with the idea of democratic justice, legal as well as ethical.
The melioristic approach we have adopted should make it clear that the UHP can only be effective insofar as it is able to stand on its own merit in an arena which allows the expression of competing and dissenting views. This state of affairs can only occur in a democracy. If it fails to catch on in such a context, it certainly will not succeed in any other. The key question for those who are attracted to the spirit if not the letter of the Universal Happiness Principle is always: How much do you want to contribute to a happier world?
This Commentary follows the text in developing further ideas evolving out of this ethics.
TEXT The ethics outlined here is designed to act as an organizing center for those motivated to work toward a happier world.
COMMENTARY
This ethics is based on the following assumptions: (1) The present world has far too much misery in it and far too little happiness; (2) To improve this situation is a valid goal for human endeavor; (3) It is reasonable to hope that those motivated to do so can further this goal.
TEXT To mobilize and direct human energies to this end, the consequent imperative is: Everyone ought to act so as to reduce unhappiness and/or increase happiness with reference to the universal aggregate of those beings capable of these states of consciousness. This proposition will be referred to as the Universal Happiness Principle, the UHP or the Principle. It is assumed that the more people who adopt this transcultural ethical imperative and the higher its priority, the better the chances of accomplishing its objective.
COMMENTARY
(a) The Universal Happiness Principle is directed to those people motivated by good will and compassion to try to reduce that portion of unhappiness which has no redeeming value and to increase the kind of happiness which is self-multiplying or has insufficient unhappy consequences to nullify its value.
Granted it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between unhappiness which has redeeming value and unhappiness which does not, still we often have little doubt we know which is which. For instance, much of the science of medicine is based on seeking means to alleviate the suffering of illness which we take for granted we would be better off without.
The truly compassionate, as I define this term, cannot accept with complacency the tragic suffering of so many millions of men, women, children and animals in today's world without wanting to do something to alleviate it. The aspiration to fulfill the Principle, then, is primarily a matter of heart, not of mind. For those without the requisite compassion and they are, unfortunately, more than we would like to think, this ethics will be a matter of indifference. On the other hand, our assumption is that not only a good heart and prayer, but an ethics based on valid reasoning and a sound psychology may contribute to improving the present situation. Hence, this philosophy.
(b) To conceive of the goal of the Principle as a means of eliminating unhappiness altogether would be utopian and counter- productive. Unhappiness is an inevitable condition in the lives of all creatures capable of happiness. Moreover, for many persons, a substantial portion of unhappy experiences can be meaningfully and fruitfully integrated into their lives, many of them, in fact, so important that, at least in retrospect, those who experience them would not want to miss them. It is not the concern of the UHP to eliminate such meaningful unhappiness. Without it, life would lack adventure and challenge.
(c) This ethics is a form of universalistic utilitarianism. As such, it opposes both egoistic and group hedonism. Group hedonism is an ethics which, whether the ethicist is aware of it or not, does not extend its concern sufficiently to those outside the agent's in-group(s). It is a necessary entailment of fulfilling the UHP, as stated, that the happiness or unhappiness of every being affected by an ethical decision must be taken into account. To the extent that this is not done, the possibility of achieving a happier world becomes that much less likely.
Up to now, universalistic utilitarians have not sufficiently closed the loopholes and ambiguities which would prevent their ethics from degenerating into egoistic or group hedonism. The term 'universal' must be taken literally to mean that all categories of sentient entities capable of happiness and unhappiness, as these terms will be defined, are included in its scope. This is a key point of this ethics.
(d) But how can outsiders get proper consideration from those who are bound to their in-groups by such ties as love, loyalty, religion, culture, mutual welfare and common interests? How can we expect people to sacrifice their happiness and even at times choose unhappiness for the sake of strangers, people of other nations, tribes, races, cultures and religions, or those toward whom they feel revulsion? For many, the answer is we can't. On the other hand, we all know from history and experience that not only the educated, powerful and specially gifted, but the simple, ordinary and uneducated as well are capable of choosing unhappiness for causes to which they have dedicated themselves. Unfortunately, these causes may be bad as well as good. The purpose of this ethics is to win devotees to the idea that one cause worthy of such a sacrifice is generating a happier universe as we will describe it here.
(e) The hedonistic utilitarianism that grew out of the 18th century Enlightenment was not really universalistic. Distinct strains of egoistic and group hedonism are detectible in it. For example, Jeremy Bentham, instead of exhorting his followers to pursue the ethical ideal of furthering the greatest happiness of all who might be affected by an ethical decision only required that they seek the greatest happiness of " those whose interest is in question." This additional phrase justifies the ethically responsible agent to give a disproportionate amount of concern to his own happiness and the in-groups with whom he identifies. Not doing so, according to Bentham, would be imprudent and Bentham decidedly disapproved of imprudence. David Lyons in his critique of Bentham in "The Form and Limits of Utilitarianism" (Oxford, 1965) recognized this narrowness of scope which he called parochialism and I call group hedonism.
Just how far Bentham himself deviated from the universality demanded by the UHP becomes clear from a chapter in Gertrude Himmelfarb's book, Victorian Minds (Knopf, 1968), called "The Haunted House of Jeremy Bentham." Bentham's "haunted house," an expression he himself attached to the enterprise in a moment of frustration, was a model prison Bentham personally designed. He called it the Panopticon because the invisible presence at the center of its weblike structure could observe everything going on in all the cells at all times, making privacy impossible. This Orwellian Big Brother was to be used not only to maintain order and discipline, but also for the unabashed exploitation of the prisoners. Bentham saw the Panopticon as a means of profiting from their forced labor. In fact, he himself wanted to be its warden.
Unlike the policies of charitable humaneness advocated by Bentham's contemporary, John Howard, the adoption of the Panopticon would have resulted in a situation not unlike what we today would call a concentration camp. "If it had been tried," wrote one critic, "it would not have succeeded, and, in its ill- success, might have ruined, or at least indefinitely retarded the progress of the great cause of Prison Improvement." Himmelfarb's many references make an unnassailable case for the conclusion that Bentham's reputation as a prison reformer was highly overrated. Fortunately, to his great chagrin, Bentham's attempts to gain support for the Panopticon were defeated. It is obvious that the Panopticon was sharply skewed for the benefit of those in control, ("those whose interest (was) in question"). Certainly, Bentham's cavalier disregard of the welfare of the inmates could only have resulted in an increase in universal unhappiness.
To use the Panopticon idea to exploit criminals was bad enough, but to use this device similarly in poor houses, factories, educational institutions, hospitals and asylums as a means of enabling an authoritarian management to manipulate practically without any accountability the lives of those in their charge for their own advantage was worse. To be sure, Bentham assumed they would be rationally benevolent (like his own enlightened self, of course!), but their interests would naturally come first. It is hard to conceive how the man who was and still is the best-known advocate for developing a rational system of ethics based on the greatest happiness principle could be so perversely naive, a naivety that would make the devil smile and provide grist for many of Dickens's novels. But Bentham was caught up in the cultural patterns of his class-conscious, hierarchical society, which, like himself, took for granted their superiority and thus felt justified in controlling the less empowered who were assumed, often for this very reason, to be less worthy of consideration.
As a result of this trend in Benthamite ethics, the word 'utilitarian' has come to mean selfish expediency. This attitude, ironically called "enlightened self-interest," continues to this day in one form or another even in the most democratic countries, discouraging that attitude of universal compassion necessary to implement the UHP. It is this disservice of Bentham to his own principle, still perpetuated in the utilitarian movement that this ethics attempts to rectify.
Nevertheless, there is also a strain of universalism in Bentham's ethics. A good example of this can be seen in a note of John Bowring who edited the earliest edition of Bentham works. He writes "The very last memorandum which I find by Bentham is this:--'I have two minds: one of which is perpetually occupied in looking at, and examining the other, -- thus studying human nature, partly with a view to my own happiness, -- partly with a view to that of the happiness of the human species.'"
The fact is Bentham made invaluable contributions to the type of ethics which makes happiness its centerpiece as this ethics does. In fact, Bentham's criterion, with all its flaws, was the original inspiration for the ethics developed here.
(f) The worst violations of the UHP occur when those people regarded as outsiders become objects of active hatred, discrimination, exploitation or oppression. This attitude often initiates a vicious circle of mutual hostility that has given rise to the inhumane practices exhibited in the aggressive wars, massacres, terrorism, torture and genocide we have witnessed throughout history and which today show no sign of abating. Indeed, not only unbelievers but millions of believers in religions which preach love, humaneness and compassion as the highest virtues have participated in these practices. This has added immeasurably to universal misery, misery which, hopefully, a serious commitment to an ethics like the one proposed here could reduce.
(g) The fact is even people with strong feelings of compassion, love and humaneness do not always practice these virtues as this ethics would have them do, namely, "with reference to the universal aggregate of beings capable of happiness and unhappiness." Actually, human nature cannot help but favor those who are near and dear to them. This in itself is by no means always incompatible with the UHP, but the UHP requires that in making ethical choices the happiness of every sentient being affected be considered as impartially as possible. This insistence on universality means that the happiness of one's enemies, criminals and other evil-doers as well as those whom we consider to be worthless and amoral cannot be overlooked. Although the majority of people would probably agree that a less unhappy, happier universe is a worthy goal, when such entailments are insisted upon, many will balk.
(h) Accepting such an ethics, however, does not mean that inflicting unhappiness is thereby excluded. The use of punishment and disciplinary measures to prevent and deter the acts of criminals and evil-doers, and to protect the innocent is as essential under the UHP as it is under all established ethical and legal systems. However, these courses of action must be taken within the limits prescribed by the Principle.
It is these limits which constitute the UHP's most controversial aspect. Specifically stated, the rule has to be that by whatever other standards punishment and discipline are deemed to be deserved, the universal scope of the Principle demands that in applying these measures, their consequences on the happiness of the persons who are their objects must be included along with the rest of those for whose sake such measures were taken in the first place. This proposition follows as a logical deduction if the idea of generating a happier universe is taken literally, as it is meant to be. In fact, justice in the context of UHP means determining as impartially as possible the manner in which the infliction of unhappiness, when necessary, will best implement its goal. Here, of course, I do not mean justice as it is exercised in courts which pertains only to the application of existing laws, but justice in the broadest sense which ought to underlie the determination of those laws as well as all ethical conduct.
To effectively apply the non-exclusionary demands of the Principle is among the most difficult tasks to carry out. This becomes especially clear in the exercise of retributive justice. Although claims for retributive punishment and compensation by those victimized by evil or criminal acts are valid considerations, the UHP requires that no more and no less suffering be imposed than that which generates the least universal unhappiness. Such a consequentialist approach is obviously not the way justice at present is normally determined.
(i) Under no conditions is torture justified under the UHP. Although some have conceived of imaginary circumstances under which such practices might be justified on utilitarian grounds, and have opposed utilitarianism for this reason, the chance of these actually occurring is so extremely remote that, for practical purposes, as "The United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment" states, no exceptions can be allowed.
(j) Only in this century, with the birth of the United Nations have we really begun to concentrate on using military force for the protection of the innocent and unempowered, for the prevention and deterrence of aggression, for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for peace-keeping. At present, efforts to carry out these functions continue to be a learning process in which our failures have been at least as many as our successes. Nevertheless, if we persist in these efforts, which, if compared with the past, are no less than revolutionary, there is no reason to believe we cannot learn how to exercise these functions in ways that will further the UHP.
TEXT Although the UHP, as it stands, is not unmeaningful, left unclarified, it is highly ambiguous and to that extent ineffective. Our task is to resolve this ambiguity by semantic differentiation, thus laying the groundwork for a practical ethics to further the stated goal.
COMMENTARY
The principal contribution of this ethics lies in the particular way this ambiguity is resolved. Its method is to give the UHP greater clarity and semantic precision by means of specific definitions and explications that make possible a deductive system that will work to implement the Principle. To do this, the language used here must be understood literally, and not symbolically or metaphorically.
TEXT The substantial dissimilarities between this approach and historical utilitarianism will be evident as we proceed.
COMMENTARY
It is essential to the understanding of this ethical system that it be distinguished from classical utilitarianism. To forestall any tendency to identify the two, the following distinctions and possible dissimilarities need to be pointed out:
(1) For historical reasons, starting with Bentham and many of his followers, and also due to the interpretations of many of their opponents, the words 'utilitarian' and 'utility' have come to have pejorative associations with narrow expediency, overemphasis on self-interest, elitism, materialism and the crassest forms of laissez-faire capitalism. I hope it will be obvious that this ethics, although utilitarian, opposes all these tendencies. Furthermore, it opposes, as we have pointed out, all forms of ethics which center solely on internal in-group interests whether these in-groups are family, tribe, institution, community, nation, or are based on cultural or ethnic factors.
(2) Despite the assumption of many opponents and some supporters of utilitarianism, it is not an entailment of this ethics that 'society' always take precedence over the individual. In fact, 'society' is one of the most ambiguous words in the language. It can so easily stand for in-groups that the decision-making agent, consciously or unconsciously, projects on some collective authority, often unidentified. But whatever it means, without due respect for the freedom and autonomy of the individual, a satisfactory infrastructure for a happier world is impossible.
On the other hand, in addition to respect for individuals, the goals of cohesive collectives -- national, ethnic, economic, religious, political, cultural, or special interests -- whether thay are minorities or majorities, must be taken into account in applying the UHP. In so doing, however, it must be kept in mind that although the goals of these collectives are determined by the real or assumed advocacy of their memberships, each individual member has a certain power and obligation to be a whistle- blower, that is, to actively use his or her will and courage as well as her vote to oppose the goals of collectives that violate ethical values. What is proposed here is that, if our goal is a happier world, it is rational to give the UHP a much higher if not the highest priority as a determinant of those values.
(3) Accepting the definitions of happiness, unhappiness and neutral states, as specified, is crucial in making the correct logical deductions urged by the Principle. Inventing the neologisms, 'eutony,' 'dystony' and 'atony' to disidentify the many other meanings of these words from the posited definitions was found to be indispensable.
(4) Happiness and unhappiness, as we use these words, are subjectively experienced states of consciousness which, in themselves, do not entail ethical considerations.
(5) This ethics disagrees with ideal or pluralistic utilitarianism which substitutes the vague idea of "the greatest good of the greatest number" for 'the greatest happiness.' 'Good' without a clear definition of its content is an empty word that can mean anything its user may have in mind or project into it, including practices that oppose the UHP. Often the user himself is at a loss, when asked, to adequately describe the contents of its referent.
(6) This ethics is a form of altruism, but it has a hedonistic component.
(7) Despite its essentially consequentialist character, this ethics has a deontological component.
(8) Although primarily a form of rule utilitarianism, this ethics has an act utilitarian component.
(9) If there are discarnate spirits or extraterrestrial beings, a single deity or a pantheon who interact with human beings and affect their happiness, and if we can ascertain how we affect theirs, if indeed we do, this must be taken into account in reaching ethical decisions guided by the UHP. In fact, any separate centers of consciousness capable of algedonic (happy or unhappy) sentiency, whenever they are detected, must come under consideration. Wrong judgments concerning the existence or non- existence of such entities, or, if existing, they do not have the characteristics attributed to them can lead to results that run counter to the UHP. The often jarring and bewildering differences in the beliefs, doubts, disbeliefs and assumptions, not to mention ignorance concerning these matters is an unsolved problem whose resolution is nowhere in sight. This is undoubtedly the most difficult, sometimes insoluble problem that has to be addressed in trying to implement the UHP.
(10) This ethics is based on the perspective of Jungian depth psychology. But the relativistic ethics of Jung's psychology cannot be applied to furthering such a specific rational goal as the UHP. We, however, intend to adapt it for that purpose.
(11) This ethics agrees with negative utilitarianism on the point that where there is a choice, focussing on reducing unhappiness will more often result in a greater implementation of the Principle than focussing on generating or increasing the happiness factor.
(12) Only centers of consciousness capable of experiencing happiness and unhappiness, as defined, ought to be direct objects of ethical concern under the UHP. To be sure, objects, organisms, artifacts and natural phenomena incapable of such consciousness will always be valued or disvalued by human beings. The reasons for such valuations may be aesthetic, sentimental, instinctive, practical, ecological, scientific, religious, or the result of psychological projection. In implementing the UHP, however, these entities must be valued only in terms of their effects on centers of algedonic consciousness, not for themselves. Sometimes, when we treat non-sentient entities as algedonically sentient, we can make serious mistakes in our attempts to implement the UHP.
(13) In assessing algedonic trends, this ethics introduces essential modifications of both the quantitative method of Bentham and the qualitative approach of J. S. Mill. Both methods, however, are useful and not mutually exclusive.
(14) This ethics has a melioristic approach which waives the usual assumption of traditional utilitarianism that its criterion of value must be the Summum Bonum. This allows for religious commitments that for many are superordinate to, but may not necessarily violate the Principle.
(15) This ethics is also melioristic in the sense that it has no final goal other than to put constant pressure to encourage us to do better in our attempts to implement the UHP. This can most easily be done on an individual and interpersonal level. On a political or public level, however, the UHP can only achieve a measure of success by a gradual and strategic infiltration into prevailing ethical structures, many of which at present are at odds with the Principle.
TEXT One key difference lies in the following definitions: Happiness or an hedonic state is posited to refer exclusively to all those conditions of consciousness which the experient likes being aware of for their own sake. Unhappiness or an algetic state is posited to refer exclusively to all those conditions of consciousness which the experient dislikes being aware of for their own sake. Happiness and unhappiness are relatively opposite conditions of immediate affective awareness determined by the way their experients positively or negatively value these experiences according to these definitions.
COMMENTARY
(a) These definitions were devised to meet the requirements for logically deducing and explicating the meaning of the UHP. They are the foundation on which this ethics is built.
(b) As posited, these definitions refer solely to subjectively experienced happiness-consciousness or unhappiness- consciousness. Using these definitions, it follows that if an I-consciousness feels or thinks (the meaning of both these verbs is identical in this context) that he or she is happy during an immediately present experience then s/he is happy, and the same applies to unhappiness.
(c) The idea that there is such a thing as unconscious happiness or unconscious unhappiness contradicts our posited definitions, but this is not meant to imply that such concepts might not be useful in other contexts.
TEXT These particular definitions are used because they encompass all the data which make a felicific ethics of concern to man.
COMMENTARY
(a) Understanding this ethics entails the acceptance of the above proposition.
(b) The term 'felicific' is used rather than 'hedonistic' because of the latter's association with egoism.
TEXT Their denotation, however, deviates substantially from many ordinary and legitimate usages of happiness and unhappiness. Unfortunately, the same would be even more true if cognate hedonic words were used. Yet adhering to these definitions, as specified, is essential to understanding this approach.
COMMENTARY
The only contenders in ordinary language that could possibly be considered to categorize the affective phenomena we want to refer to were 'pleasure' and 'pain.' but the usages of these and cognate words have denotations and connotations that make them even more misleading than happiness and unhappiness.
TEXT This problem, which seriously interferes with accurate communication, could be solved by the use of neologisms. For instance,'eutony' could be used to stand for what we have defined as happiness and 'dystony' for unhappiness. But such a departure from normal discourse would greatly complicate the communication process. For this reason, we will continue most of the time to use ordinary language. Nevertheless, to ensure that the exact intended meaning is conveyed or where the use of the words 'happiness' and 'unhappiness' would be out of place, we will substitute these neologisms.
COMMENTARY
Etymologically, 'eutony.' 'dystony' and 'atony' (see below) all have common Greek roots which are the basis for many English words. Eutony is derived from 'eu' = good + the English 'tone' from 'tonos' = tension. Dystony is derived from 'dys' = bad + 'tone,' and atony derives from 'a' = without + 'tone.' Dystony and atony are legitimate dictionary words, but they have different meanings here. In this commentary, we will also use the neologism 'dyseutonic' (dystony and/or eutony) for what we have up to now referred to as algedonic.
TEXT Using the new terminology, another way of stating the Principle is: Everyone ought to act so as to bring about a less dystonic (unhappy) and/or a more eutonic (happier) universe, whichever is greater under the circumstances, and at the same time for the same reason refrain from or prevent acts that will bring about a more dystonic and/or a less eutonic universe.
COMMENTARY
This ethics obviously can not take into account that portion of unhappiness, to the degree that it exists, which is imposed upon us for valid reasons that go beyond ordinary human knowledge. It is based on the simple conviction that not all unhappiness is fruitful, and that a happier universe without this component would be a better one.
TEXT To experience eutony and dystony, the subject must be in a sufficiently differentiated state of affective awareness to make liking or disliking an experience for its own sake possible. A cognitive recognition of being in this state, however, is not essential, but of course it is a common accompaniment in human beings and usually intensifies the affect. In animals capable of these states, the level of introspection which constitutes this recognition probably does not occur.
COMMENTARY Because animals capable of dyseutonic feelings derive them, as far as we know, mainly through immediate biological satisfactions, they are usually referred to in ordinary language as pleasure and pain and not as happiness and unhappiness. Happiness and unhappiness often refer to long periods of time which encompass memories and anticipations which animals, again, as far as we know, cannot experience in this way. To refer to the more immediate, momentary feeling states of consciousness, we have included in our definitions of happiness and unhappiness the idea of hedonic (eutonic) and algetic (dystonic) states. There is no doubt that the higher animals do experience these states. They are therefore included as constituents of the universal aggregate of beings capable of happiness and unhappiness and must be taken into account in implementing the Principle.
TEXT There is also a third classification consisting of those conditions of being which are neither happiness nor unhappiness, as defined. In ordinary language, these conditions would usually be referred to as neutral states or states of indifference, but to conform to this categorization, they will be designated by the neologism, 'atony.' When conscious, a state of atony exists when subject has no particular inclination of liking or disliking an experience. Atony always obtains when the experient is unconscious or when the level of consciousness is not sufficiently differentiated for the experience of eutony or dystony to be constellated.
COMMENTARY
'Indifference' and 'neutral states' have several meanings in addition to the one specified by this neologism. Indifference, for instance, in certain contexts refers to uncaring or neglectful states of mind. In other usages, they refer to a deliberate unwillingness to be aware of certain situations where ethical action is called for. Similarly, a neutral state may denote an attitude of wanting to avoid involvement, or not wishing to take sides. Since these meanings distort the idea we wish to communicate, the word 'atony' was devised to refer to subjective states toward which the experient feels neither affective attraction nor aversion. The dynamic advocated by the Universal Happiness Principle is a unidirectional vector moving at any point either from greater to lesser universal unhappiness (dystony), from universal unhappiness to atony, from atony to happiness (eutony), or from lesser to greater happiness.
Whether experienced as a state of consciousness or not, atony in itself has no intrinsic value or disvalue in this ethical format, but when a dynamic is initiated by a decision which reduces unhappiness to atony among those involved, the result is a positive value in terms of the UHP. On the other hand, if happiness is reduced to a state of atony by such a decision, the result is a negative value.
TEXT
Ethical and non-ethical aspects of happiness and unhappiness.
Under these posited definitions, experiences of happiness are feelings that have immediate feeling value for their experients. Similarly, experiences of unhappiness have immediate disvalue for their experients. These are given axiological facts to which ethical distinctions do not apply. In this non-ethical sense, happiness, as defined, always feels 'good' to its experient as unhappiness always feels 'bad.'
COMMENTARY
(a) In the context of this ethics, it should be clear that morally reprehensible hedonic states in themselves must be regarded as just as much genuine experiences of happiness as those which are ethically commendable. As long as the subjects themselves experience conditions of being according to the stipulations of our definitions, they are authentic.
(b) The words 'good' and 'bad,' have several legitimate usages in which ethical considerations are irrelevant. However, when 'good' is coupled with 'evil' or 'sin' as its opposite, an ethical connotation is inevitable. In the above text, the word 'evil' would be misused if seen to be synonymous with 'bad.'
(c) There is a common usage of happiness which assumes that, to be 'true' or 'real,' happiness must somehow be connected with ethical approbation. In this sense. 'pleasure,' which does not have this connotation, would be a better equivalent for what we mean. Correct understanding of this ethics precludes attaching to the concept of happiness per se this narrow usage. This is another reason for substituting the neologism 'eutony' for 'happiness' which does not have this fringe association.
(d) In Aristotle's "Ethics," the concept of eudaimonia, sometimes translated or mistranslated (depending on the authority) as happiness, is defined as an activity of the soul in accordance with arete, the Greek concept of virtue. As such, happiness is an ethical concept with an entirely different meaning from eutony. In fact, as I read the contexts of this word as Aristotle's uses it, eudaimonia may not necessarily imply affective experience at all.
When Thomas Aquinas in his "Summae" took over this concept from Aristotle, he translated it into Latin as beatitudo which in English is translated as 'happiness' or 'blessedness.' By analogy, then, this word would refer to an activity of the soul accompanying the Christian idea of virtue which means something quite different from Aristotle's usage. In any case, it is obvious that both the Aristotelian and Thomistic usages have ethical connotations and qualitative distinctions which are sharply at variance with our categorization.
(e) Another misleading idea associated with a common usage of 'happiness' comes from its etymological derivation from the word 'hap.' The inference often drawn from this connection is that happiness is an unpredictable condition that comes about as a matter of chance, luck, or grace rather than willful human activity. While no doubt some experiences of eutony are of this kind, there are also many eutonic (and of course dystonic) experiences for which the willful action of human beings are responsible.
All the above historical ideas, fringe asssociations and meanings connected with happiness, unhappiness and neutral states can have a distorting effect on the meanings specified by our definitions. In order to properly explicate the intended infrastructure of this ethics, that specificity must be retained. Only by the semantic method of using neologisms can these words be divested of such extraneous connotations.
Written by Roger Lyons.
The author would appreciate your comments, he can be reached at: mlrlyons@peoplepc.com
|
You are Visitor No:
|